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Presented is a novel interactive framework for incorporating both safety and performance 
analyses in early systems architecture design, thus allowing the study of possible trade-offs. 
Traditionally, a systems architecture is first defined by the architects and then passed to 
experts, who manually create artefacts such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for safety 
assessment, or computational workflows, for performance assessment. The downside of this 
manual approach is that if the architect modifies the systems architecture, most of the process 
needs to be repeated, which is tedious and time consuming. This limits the exploration of the 
design space, with the associated risk of missing better architectures. To overcome this 
limitation, the proposed framework automates parts of the safety and performance analysis 
in the context of the Requirement, Functional, Logical, and Physical (RFLP) systems 
engineering paradigm. Safety analysis is carried out by automatic creation of FTA models 
from the functional and logical flow views. Regarding performance analysis, computational 
workflows are first automatically created from the logical flow view, and then executed for a 
set of flight conditions over the range of the mission in order to determine the most demanding 
condition. Finally, performance characteristics of the subsystems, such as weights, power 
offtakes, ram drag etc. are evaluated at the most demanding flight condition, which enables 
the architect to compare architectures at aircraft level. The framework is illustrated with a 
representative example involving the design of an environmental control system of a civil 
aircraft, where the safety and performance trade-off is conducted for multiple ECS 
architectures. 
I. Introduction 
System safety is of paramount importance in all industries and particularly in aerospace. Specifically, in relation to 
(civil) aircraft, there are many failure conditions which may lead to a potentially fatal accident, involving multiple 
casualties, damage to the aircraft, the surrounding area of the accident and which incur substantial monetary losses. 
Certification documents, such as the Certification Specifications CS-25 [1], establish safety objectives on the different 
parts of the aircraft in order to keep the probability of catastrophic accidents to a minimum. Safety can be improved 
in different ways, e.g., by employing more reliable components or implementing different redundancy strategies. In 
order to select the best architecture, both performance and safety considerations need to be accounted for. Currently, 
safety analyses are performed manually, based on informal models and various documents, such as  certification 
documents, which introduces unnecessary subjectivity and  lack of consistency to the analyses [2]. A similar situation 
is encountered when the architecture is sized, and its performance obtained. The process of orchestrating sizing models 
from the architecture definition is also largely manual and therefore time consuming [3]. The prevalence of manual 
processes usually requires extensive communication between the architect and other teams of experts. This limits the 
time for exploration of the design space, with the associated risk of missing better architectures. Thus, computational 
methods that allow the designers to quickly define and assess architectures are necessary in order to enable the 
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exploration of more alternatives. Furthermore, these methods need to be interactive to keep the architects in charge of 
the most creative part of the design process, responding to their request and feeding back the relevant results.  In turn, 
automating most repetitive design tasks not only speeds up the design process, but enables the required interactivity. 
Recent work by Jimeno et al. [4] discussed the limitations concerning existing methods for automating the safety 
assessment of architectures and proposed a novel safety framework, focused on automation and interactivity. The 
framework enables the creation of safety requirements through functional hazard analysis. It also facilitates the 
assessment of safety by means of an algorithm to automatically create fault trees from the architecture definition. An 
interactive method for adding redundancy to the architecture is also presented. 
Regarding the problem of sizing aircraft systems architectures, several approaches to automate the process have 
been proposed in recent years. Liscouët-Hanke at al. [5], [6], proposed a methodology where the architecture is 
composed of power system modules which can be run in sizing mode, to obtain their sizing characteristics; and 
performance mode, to obtain off-design energy flows, used to calculate aircraft level performance. The interfaces of 
this power modules are generic enough to allow orchestration of subsystems, which is made manually in terms of 
power consumers, distributors and generators. Each subsystem is designed following a functional approach to allow 
different technology choices. The energy flows, and therefore sizes of the system, are modelled as function of time 
(including different phases) and operation mode (normal, degraded or failure mode). De Tenorio et al. [7], [8] also 
employ a functional approach in order to select subsystem solutions. The subsystems then are sized in order to satisfy 
requirements throughout the mission, which consist of three dimensions: flight phase, flight conditions and failed 
architecture configurations. The execution of subsystem models is scheduled in terms of the functional flows between 
components. The subsystem sizing problem is posed as an optimization problem where the objective function equals 
to the weighted of several subsystem attributes, allowing for trade-offs between different attributes. This subsystem 
level performance is related to aircraft level optimization through the values of the weighting factors, which can be 
changed by the aircraft level optimizer in order to maximize the aircraft utility. A functional approach to subsystem 
architecting is employed by Chakraborty et al. [9], leveraging the choice of alternative solutions for each aircraft 
subsystem. The approach for subsystem sizing consists of steady state equations models representing subsystems and 
empirical relations. When these equations are solved, the most relevant sizing parameter of the particular subsystem 
architectures are obtained. The models are orchestrated by linking power consuming subsystems to their respective 
distribution elements, which in turn are connected to the power generation and distribution devices. In order to obtain 
the subsystem sizing point, only one or few points of the mission are considered for each subsystem. These points are 
selected a priori, generally based on previous works. This sizing methodology also considers basic aircraft level 
resizing rules, based on the subsystems sizing results. The aircraft’s new sizes further influence the subsystems results, 
leading to an iterative process. Judt and Lawson’s approach [10], [11], utilize a methodology that generates the full 
enumeration of architectures given a function tree. This function tree consists on the aircraft functions (boundary 
functions), for which one or more candidate solutions are proposed, which in turn induce more functions which can 
be satisfied by different solutions, inducing more functions and so forth. The approach employed for determining the 
execution subsystem order depends on the interfaces between subsystems which are determined manually and 
reviewed continuously until a sufficient level of confidence is obtained.  The sizing strategy for the subsystems consist 
of a representative mission plus specific mission failure scenarios for the components that are active in such situations. 
Bile et al. [3], [12] proposed a framework for automated sizing of airframe systems from the logical view of the 
architecture, consisting of architecture components and their connections. The proposed framework also accounts for 
functions as a central element in the architecting process. With this approach, different architectures can be proposed 
by varying the components and their connections. Components have associated computational models which are 
orchestrated based on their input-output relations at component level, and source-sink relationships at subsystem level. 
This approach only considers one mission point for sizing. Several conclusions can be drawn by comparing the 
aforementioned methods:  
 The approaches employed to orchestrating sizing models allow for the automatic sizing of the architecture 
once its definition process, which is not automated in any case, has been completed. Regarding the level 
of detail of the architecture represented by the orchestrated models, it is found that in general they 
represent the subsystems of the architecture. This allows substituting one subsystem for an alternative 
one as long as a model for each one of them is available. However, it presents the limitation of not being 
able to process the change of a single component, without manually editing the subsystem model. One 
exception is the framework proposed by Bile at al. [3], which allows a finer degree of granularity since 
the models in it are associated to components. 
 Concerning the amount of information (one point, several points, or a mission) that is used to find the 
sizing point of the system, the most restrictive approach is that of Bile et al. as it considers only a single 
point. The work of Chakraborty at al. [9] has the drawback that extensive previous knowledge is required 
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to select a priori the sizing points. The rest of the approaches provide a higher level of detail, considering 
different flight phases, flight conditions and also failed architecture configurations in the case of Tenorio 
et al. [7], [8]. Still, the information regarding flight conditions is limited to a small number of predefined 
scenarios and no guidance to choose the failure conditions is provided in any of the approaches. 
 It can also be concluded that functions are a key part of the architecting process, especially when selecting 
alternative architectures. 
 The comparison of the above approaches has shown that the potential trade-offs that appear when sizing 
subsystems have been neglected and only a single solution to the sizing problem is considered, except in 
the case of de Tenorio et al. [8], who enable trade-offs thanks to their proposed subsystem sizing problem 
formulation. 
With the purpose of overcoming the above mentioned limitations, the work presented in this paper aims to integrate 
subsystems sizing and performance with the safety framework described in Jimeno et al. [4]. The framework allows 
functional reasoning as an enabler of the architecting process, which the literature review has been shown to be 
important, and also provides the necessary safety features. Jimeno et al. proposed a novel sizing process, considering 
safety, mission and flight conditions variations in the flight envelope in a continuous manner, which goes beyond the 
most detailed approaches found in the literature. A high level of detail is considered, allowing to perform changes in 
the architecture at a component level while maintaining a high degree of automation. After the sizing is complete, the 
aircraft-level performance can be obtained, including the weight, power offtakes, and additional drag of its subsystems. 
This last step enables the trade-off between different architecture configurations in terms of both safety and 
performance within in a single framework. 
 
Within this context, the objective of the presented here work has been the development of a novel interactive 
framework for incorporating both safety and performance analyses in early systems architecture design, thus allowing 
the study of possible trade-offs. The scope is limited to early design, under the assumption that the requirements, 
functions, and logical views of the (systems) architecture are defined, including relations between elements of different 
domains, such as which components satisfy which functions. The aircraft mission, flight envelope and atmospheric 
variations that the aircraft is intended to handle successfully are also considered as known. Additionally, computational 
models for sizing and performance, describing the different logical components of the architecture, are assumed to be 
available, e.g. provided by the pertinent experts. The physical view, detailing aircraft geometry and subsystems spatial 
layout, is not considered at this level of detail and analysis requiring geometric or layout information, such as thermal 
analysis of the aircraft, are therefore out of scope.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background information and terminology used in 
the manuscript. The proposed framework is described in Section III. Section IV demonstrates the application of the 
proposed approach with the help of a representative test case. Finally, summary, conclusions and plans for future work 
are presented in Section V. 
II. Background 
In this section, information related to the terminology used in the proposed framework for safety and performance 
trade-off (Section III) is provided. 
A. RFLP (Requirements, Functional, Logical, Physical) Paradigm 
RFLP assumes that functional reasoning as part of the systems architecting process is distributed over four notional 
domains: Requirements, Functional, Logical, and Physical [15]. It is based on the German guideline VDI 2206, 
“Design methodology for mechatronic systems” [16]. The requirements domain displays all the architecture 
requirements, which are extracted from the stakeholders’ needs. Requirements can be of functional or performance 
type, and it is possible to decompose them hierarchically. Functional requirements are mapped to the functions of the 
system in the functional domain. The functional domain contains all the architecture functions, that is, actions that the 
system must perform to meet the stakeholders' needs. Functions are linked to the components that satisfy them, and 
vice-versa. The logical domain consists of components, solutions satisfying the functions, and their interconnections 
via ports. 
In this paper, the RFLP paradigm is augmented with two domains. “Safety domain” for enabling safety assessment 
of the architecture, as proposed by Jimeno et al. [4], and “computational domain” for providing the capability of 
automated systems sizing, as proposed by Bile et al. [3]. Additionally, traceability between different view of the 
architecture is incorporated, as suggested by Guenov et al. [15], enabling a more effective and interactive design 
process.  
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B. Safety Domain 
The safety domain allows the creation of safety artifacts such as functional hazard analysis (FHA) or fault tree analysis 
(FTA) from the RFLP definition of the architecture, maintaining links with the elements existing in the requirements, 
functional and logical domains of the architecture. 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA): FTA is a deductive failure analysis that focuses on one undesired event, the top event, and 
determines its causes in terms of basic events and their relations expressed through logical gates. According to Ruijters 
and Stoelinga [13], two kinds of fault trees analysis techniques exists, qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative 
techniques provide numerical values for failure probabilities or importance measures, which can be used to rank 
components according to the contribution to system failure. Qualitative techniques provide insight into the structure 
of the tree and facilitate the detection of vulnerabilities. Some of the most popular qualitative techniques are cut sets 
and path sets, which are described below.  
Minimal Cut Sets: A cut set is a combination of basic events in the fault tree that cause system failure, i.e., the top 
event in the tree occurs. A cut set is said to be minimal when no subset is a cut set [13], thus it is a minimal set of 
components that cause system failure. Minimal cut sets can be used to determine the qualitative importance of the 
basic events and potential common-causes to system failure [14]. Additionally, if the probability of failure of the basic 
events are known, cut sets can be used to obtain the probability of occurrence of the top event. 
Minimal Path Sets: A minimal path set is the opposite of a minimal cut set, that is, a minimal set of basic events such 
that if any of them occurs, the system remains operational [13]. In other words, the top event of the tree does not occur. 
Similar to minimal cut sets, minimal path sets provide qualitative information about the reliability of the system and 
can be used to obtain the probability of failure of the top event. 
C. Computational Domain 
The computational domain is a notional domain introduced in [3] with its primary purpose to automatically orchestrate 
the computational models (e.g. steady state equations) associated with each component in the logical view into sizing 
computational workflows. Indirectly this domain is used to manage the dependencies between parameters, i.e., the 
numerical values that describe some (behavioral) characteristics of the components, and which can be linked to 
performance requirements. 
Computational Model: A computational model is an executable piece of computer code that describes part of the 
physical behavior and other relevant characteristics (e.g. weight or cost) of an architectural logical component. Every 
logical component has one or more such models associated with it. Models have inputs and outputs. Execution of the 
model updates the values of the outputs according to the values of the inputs. 
Computational Workflow: A computational workflow is an ordered set of computational models. The order of models 
is such that every model only depends on outputs of the models appearing earlier in the order. The workflow can be 
abstracted as a computational model representing the set of models. Since the subsystems of the architectures are 
composed of components, and these are represented by computational models, the workflow containing all these 
models describes the behavior of the subsystem. 
III. Proposed Approach 
A novel approach is proposed to integrate subsystems sizing and performance with the safety extension to the 
RFLP paradigm. As shown in Fig. 1, both safety and performance are regarded in the framework as two-way 
processes, which interact with each other not directly but through the modification of the architecture definition. The 
architecture definition is used as an input to safety analyses such as FTA. In turn, the safety results are used to update 
the architecture, for example, by adding new requirements or redundant components to ensure safety compliance. 
Architectural changes impact the system performance, which might demand even further modification, which in turn 
affect safety and so forth. The proposed approach enables the assessment of the impact caused by modifications of the 
architecture definition in the sizing and performance of the subsystems.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Architecting process including safety and performance 
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Fig. 2 shows an overview of the existing RFLP safety framework [4] (in light blue) and the necessary additions 
and modifications to cater for the proposed methodology. A Mission & Flight Conditions view of the architecture is 
added; the Computational View is modified to include the information provided related to mission. The Mission & 
Flight Conditions view contains the necessary information related to the intended mission of the aircraft such as the 
different flight phases, their characteristics and information about the ambient conditions that can be encountered 
during these phases. 
 
Fig. 2 RFLP Framework augmented with Safety and Computational Domains 
The intended use of the framework is described through a series of steps, represented by means of a flowchart in 
Fig. 3. The process starts with the architecture definition, where the system is described by the requirements, functional 
and logical views. Next, the safety and performance analyses are performed, and finally a trade-off is conducted with 
respect to the performance requirements and figures of merit. The rest of this section describes the individual steps in 
detail. 
 
Fig. 3 Flowchart of the Proposed Framework for Safety and Performance Trade-off 
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A. Safety Analysis 
The safety analysis is comprised of two methods. The first method supports partial automation of the functional hazard 
analysis process, using the functional view as input. The FHA results are then used to update the safety objectives in 
the requirements view. The second method automatically generates Fault trees from the Logical view. These trees can 
be evaluated both qualitatively and quantitatively and the contribution to the probability of failure of their components 
can be ranked through importance measures, helping the architect to focus on the most problematic parts of the 
architecture. 
 
Creation of Functional Hazard Analysis Model: The first step in the safety analysis is to support the creation of 
functional hazard analysis (FHA) models. First, a list of functions of the system is obtained to analyze the hazards 
related to them. This list is compiled automatically by traversing part of the functional view of the architecture in its 
hierarchical form. In this form, functions are organized using parent-child relationships (with at most one parent), 
resulting in a data structure known as tree. The scope of the  FHA  is  determined  by  the  selected  components  to  
analyze,  e.g. the components forming the subsystem under  study. The functions that map to the selected components, 
plus all their children are included in the FHA. More details of the method are presented in an earlier publication from 
the authors [4]. 
 
Creation of Fault Tree Analysis Model: The second step in the safety analysis involves creation of fault tree 
analysis (FTA) models from the logical flow view. First the  algorithm  gathers  the  necessary  information  to  
construct  the  gate  that  describe  a  failure  in  the  output.  This is assumed to happen when the component that 
provides the output of any of its inputs fails, hence the type is set to OR. Before constructing the gate, the subtrees 
rooted on the gates inputs are determined. Finally, these subtrees and the basic event of component fail are put together 
with the OR gate. The tree connections are created in a similar way as described above, however, instead of receiving 
a model output receives a model input. This input is used to get the connection to be modelled by the gate. The type 
of the gate is determined by redundancy type specified in the connection, e.g. AND when any output can be used, k/N 
for voting systems where k correct inputs out of N are needed, and SPARE gates for modelling dynamic redundancy. 
Then, the outputs reached are obtained by get-outputs, the outputs will be filtered according to whether they belong 
to the set of parents and the logic determined by the type of gate. Before constructing the gate, the subtrees rooted on  
the  gates  inputs  are  determined  for  each  one  of  them. Finally, these subtrees describing the failure of the 
component inputs are put together with the gate. More details can be found in an earlier publication from the authors 
[4]. 
B. Performance Analysis 
The performance analysis is comprised of three steps. First the different configurations of the architectures are 
identified. Next, the computational workflows representing the subsystems in each of their configurations are created. 
Finally, the systems are sized by taking the most demanding flight condition. 
Determination of configurations: The study of the different configurations that a system can adopt is fundamental 
for the sizing of the architecture subsystems. This is due to the fact that some components are only active in certain 
configurations, so ignoring them will provide insufficient information for their sizing. Additionally, some 
configurations demand more from some components than others, specially failed configurations where the surviving 
component need to compensate the loss of the failed component. Considering these situations is fundamental for 
sizing. For every configuration the active components and their connections are used to automatically assemble a 
computational workflow. 
The determination of different design configurations, according to different flight phases, depends exclusively on 
the architect’s knowledge about the system being designed. However, FTA results can provide guidance to the 
architect to determine degraded scenarios. The minimal path sets obtained from FTA indicate the smallest number of 
components that, if working properly, enables the system to perform its intended functions. Therefore, these 
combinations are good candidates to determine degraded scenarios. If the architect wishes to consider additional 
scenarios, minimal cut sets can also provide valuable information. Due to the nature of minimal cut sets if any of the 
elements of the sets goes back to its operational state the whole system becomes operational. Following this strategy, 
every set can provide as many degraded conditions as the number of elements it contains.  
Depending on the architecture definition and number of redundant components, the number of different degraded 
scenarios that may be considered can grow quickly and soon become intractable. Good engineering judgment from 
the architect is necessary to select only the most significant combinations, which is not necessarily an easy task 
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considering only a priori information. Enabling interactive links between the FTA results and the logical components 
of the architecture is proposed as a method to visually aid the designer with this task.  
 
Creation of computational workflows: The process of creating a computational workflow for the subsystems of 
the architecture is based on the approach described in Bile et al. [3]. In this approach workflows are assembled at two 
levels:  
 At subsystem level, individual workflows are created for each one of subsystems based on input-output 
relations. One computational workflow needs to be created for each subsystem in each of its configurations. 
This is because every configuration includes different components and interconnections which translate into 
different workflows of models. 
 At system level, those workflows are ordered in a sequence determined by the source-sink relationships 
between subsystems. A subsystem that demand any kind of flow (e.g. electric power) from another subsystem 
is executed before the latter.  
 
Sizing based on most demanding condition: 
The proposed framework uses a set of flight conditions over the range of mission in order to determine the most 
demanding condition. Full factorial design of experiment is employed in order to consider a wide range of all possible 
combinations. The idea is to find the most demanding condition as it will represent the sizing point of the component. 
This is the logic that is followed for quantities that are sized based on extreme values, such as the peak power a battery 
needs to be able to provide. For this purpose, the valid region of the ambient variables (altitude, density, pressure, 
speed, etc.) space, where the sizing point will be searched for, needs to be defined manually by the architect or a 
relevant expert. A special sizing case is that of the sizing of magnitudes that are consumed during the mission, such 
as the necessary capacity of a battery or the amount of fuel. For sizing this kind of components, integration over 
mission profiles of the design mission or missions needs to be considered. The problem consists of finding the 
maximum necessary size of the component in a region of the ambient variables, e.g. which ambient conditions lead to 
a maximum power demand for a battery. The extent of this region depends on the flight phase. The maximum demand 
for a sizing variable is obtained for every flight condition in failure-free and failed conditions. This is valuable 
information that can not only determine the final size for the subsystem components but help the architect to 
understand the behavior of the system throughout its intended mission. 
In order to compare different architectures at top (aircraft) level, it is necessary to obtain the aircraft performance 
taking into account the weight, additional drag and power offtakes of the aircraft subsystems.  If the tool used to 
compute aircraft level performance does not allow the detailed consideration of some of drag or secondary power 
consumptions, , the performance penalties caused by subsystems drag and secondary power extraction can be 
calculated following the methodology developed by Chakraborty [19]. In brief,  it  obtains the mission performance 
with the secondary power outtakes set to zero and no additional subsystem drag considered, and then iterates through 
every mission step in reversed order (starting at landing, finishing at take-off), adding the contribution of secondary 
power to the amount of fuel burned.  
C. Safety and performance trade-offs 
The whole process of safety and performance analysis described above can be repeated for many different 
architectures. If the results are not satisfactory, e.g. the requirements are not met, new architectures or modifications 
to the existing ones can be proposed. This will trigger the sizing and performance process for these new architectures, 
providing a new set of results. The process will be repeated as many times as necessary until the architect is satisfied. 
 
IV. Demonstration 
In this section, the approach for aircraft safety and performance trade-off is demonstrated through a use case. The 
objective of this use case is to highlight and discuss the capabilities and benefits of the presented methodology, not to 
come up with the best aircraft design. An in-house developed software, named “AirCADia Architect” [20], is used for 
(1) synthesizing the airframe systems architectures, and (2) analyzing the safety and performance characteristics of 
the synthesized architectures. Moreover, publically available computational models are employed for the performance 
estimation of aircraft configurations and subsystems architectures. The rest of the section is divided into two parts: 
the application use case is described first, then the individual steps of the proposed methodology are applied on the 
case study. 
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A. Use Case Description 
In order to demonstrate the proposed methodology, a use case involving the design of Environmental Control 
System (ECS) is considered. A trade-off between safety and performance characteristics is conducted for multiple 
(conventional and electric) ECS architectures. The schematic diagram of the ECS is shown in Fig. 4. Two options are 
considered for air supply. In the first case, referred to as conventional (bleed-air) ECS architecture, air supply units 
take hot air bled from the stages of engine compressors. In the second case, referred to as electric (bleed-less) ECS 
architecture, air supply units take ram air through the dedicated air inlets, and compress it using compressors powered 
by electric motor. The air from the supply units is then passed through the ozone converters in order to remove ozone 
particles. Next, the air conditioning packs are used to cool the air at the required temperature. There are many different 
architectures proposed for the air conditioning packs, however in the current research work, only the bootstrap air 
cycle machine is considered. In both conventional (bleed-air) and electric (bleed-less) ECS architectures, ram air from 
separate air inlets is used as coolant in air conditioning packs. Next, the fresh conditioned air is mixed with some 
portion of recirculated air (from the cabin) in the mixing manifold, and is passed to the cabin. In the present work, the 
aircraft is assumed to be comprised of three separately controlled temperature zones: flight deck, and two cabin zones 
A and B. The required temperature of the cabin supply air may be different for each zone, due to different target 
temperatures and internal heat loads. Therefore, the air conditioning pack provides the air with lowest required cabin 
supply temperature among all the cabin zones, and the higher temperature requirements for the remaining cabin zones 
are fulfilled by mixing the cold air from air conditioning pack with the trim air from the hot air manifold. 
 
Fig. 4: Schematic Diagram of Environmental Control System (ECS) 
In order to perform safety analysis, only the functional and logical flow views of ECS architectures are required. 
However, for the performance analysis, information about the whole aircraft and its mission is required, so that 
different ECS architectures can be assessed at aircraft-level (in terms of block fuel, range, etc.). For this purpose, a 
single-aisle conventional (tube-and-wing) configuration, similar to Airbus A320 and Boeing 737, is considered. In 
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addition, the mission considered for the performance analysis includes taxi-out, take-off, climb, cruise, descent, 
landing, and taxi-in segments.  
B. Proposed Approach Implementation 
This section is concerned with the implementation of the proposed approach for aircraft safety and performance trade-
off, described in Section III. The process starts with defining the requirements view. Here, AirCADia Architect is used 
to generate the requirements hierarchy of a typical environmental control system (ECS), which includes functional, 
performance, and safety requirements, as shown in Fig. 5. These safety requirements (shown in pink color) and 
performance requirements (shown in blue color) will be considered during safety and performance trade-off. The 
target values for safety requirements are obtained through functional hazard analysis (FHA), as discussed in reference 
[4]. Note that in addition to safety and performance requirements (shown in Fig. 5), other key parameters of the ECS 
such as mass, power offtake, ram drag etc. will also be considered during trade-off, which are discussed later. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Requirements View 
After defining the requirements, the next step is to generate the functional and logical architectures. Here, the 
concept of functional-logical zigzagging [20] is employed to generate the functional and logical flow views. The 
logical flow view of a simplified electrical environmental control system, generated in AirCADia Architect, is shown 
in Fig. 6. It features a single air conditioning pack with a single heat exchanger, which is fed with high pressure air by 
an electric compressor. Once the functional and logical flow views have been defined, the ECS architecture can be 
analyzed from performance and safety perspectives simultaneously. 
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Fig. 6: Logical Flow View for a Simplified Environment Control System (ECS) 
In order to size the components of ECS, the three-step process described in Section III is applied. 
Step 1:  Identify all the configurations of the architecture. In this case, for the simplified ECS architecture (shown 
in Fig. 6), there is only one configuration present due to the lack of redundant components. 
Step 2:  Create the computational workflow for each configuration. Here, a method from Bile et al. [3] is employed 
to automatically/dynamically generate the computational workflows. The computational workflow of the simplified 
ECS is shown in Fig. 7. 
 
Fig. 7: Computational Workflow of the Simplified ECS 
Step 3:  Size the system based on the worst case flight condition. This step involves identifying all the flight 
conditions and then executing the computational workflow for each of the flight conditions. The one which requires 
the maximum power offtake becomes the worst case, and is used for sizing the components of the ECS. The collection 
of different flight conditions can be obtained from the specified mission. The assumed mission speed schedules for 
climb, cruise and descent segments are given in Table 1. The climb segment is flown with constant speed of 250 kts 
CAS for altitude up to 10000 feet, and 280 kts CAS above 10000 feet until transition. For the cruise segment, constant 
altitude of 35000 feet and Mach number of 0.78 are considered. In practice, however, the cruise segment is flown in 
steps of constant altitude (i.e. step-cruise) due to air-traffic management. Finally, the descent segment is flown with 
the fixed speed of 250 kts CAS. In addition, the flight conditions on ground (for takeoff/landing) are considered from 
normal (ISA), cold (ISA-55℃) and hot (ISA+35℃) days. 
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Table 1: Speed Schedules for Mission Segments 
Climb Segment Speed Schedule Cruise Segment Speed Schedule Descent Segment Speed Schedule 
Altitude 
[ft] 
Speed 
CAS [kts] 
Speed 
Mach 
Altitude 
[ft] 
Speed 
CAS [kts] 
Speed 
Mach 
Altitude 
[ft] 
Speed 
CAS [kts] 
Speed 
Mach 
1500 250 0.388 35000 264.4 0.78 35000 250 0.741 
5000 250 0.413    30000 250 0.668 
7500 250 0.432    25000 250 0.604 
10000 250 0.452    20000 250 0.547 
15000 280 0.555    15000 250 0.497 
20000 280 0.610    10000 250 0.452 
25000 280 0.672    7500 250 0.432 
30000 280 0.742    5000 250 0.413 
31000 280 0.757    1500 250 0.388 
32463 280 0.780       
35000 264.4 0.780       
A full-factorial design of experiment study was conducted in the AirCADia software by considering different 
combinations of altitude, speed, and ISA temperature deviations.  The results of executing the computational work for 
all the different combinations of flight conditions are shown as scatter plots and parallel coordinates plot in Fig. 8. It 
can be identified that the values for the fresh air mass flow rate varies from 1.55 kg/s to 4.81 kg/s. Similarly, the 
required power offtake varies approximately from 15.5 kW to 226 kW. As the maximum power offtake required by 
the ECS is ~226 kW, therefore the worst-case flight condition for the sizing the simplified ECS architecture 
corresponds to it, i.e. 30000 ft altitude, 0.78 Mach speed, and ISA + 35℃ temperature. This condition results in the 
total mass of the simplified ECS equal to ~997 lb. 
 
 
Fig. 8: Performance Characteristics of the simplified ECS 
Next, the generated ECS architecture is analyzed for safety assessment. The functional and logical flow views of 
the simplified ECS is used to automatically generate the fault tree analysis (FTA) models for different failure 
conditions by employing the method proposed in reference [4] .  The resulting FTA model for condition “failure to 
control cabin pressure” is shown in Fig. 9. 
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Fig. 9: Fault Tree Analysis Diagram 
The results of the fault tree analysis for the condition “failure to control cabin pressure” are shown in Table 2. The 
relative probabilities of failure assigned to each element (shown in column 3) are for demonstration purposes. The 
minimal cuts are displayed in descending importance according to their relative probability (probability of the sets 
divided by the probability of the top event). The calculated probability of failure to control the cabin pressure is 3 ×
10−5, which is greater than the required target value of  10−7, i.e. the safety of the system is not satisfactory. 
Table 2: Result of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for Simplified ECS 
Minimal Cut Set No. of Components Relative Probability 
Generator 1 0.333 
ECS Pack 1 1 0.333 
Electric Compressor 1 1 0.333 
Zone 1 1 3.33e-6 
Outlet Vent 1 1 3.33e-6 
Mixing Manifold 1 1 3.33e-6 
Ram Air Inlet 1 1 3.33e-6 
Ram Air Inlet 2 1 3.33e-6 
Inlet Vent Regulator 1 1 3.33e-6 
Probability of Failure: 𝑃(Failure to control the cabin pressure) =  3 × 10−5 
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In order to improve the safety of the electric environmental control system, two new ECS architectures with 
redundant components were created in AirCADia Architect. The first is a double-redundant architecture, where one 
extra air conditioning pack, electric compressor and motor are added. The second architecture is a triple-redundant 
with two extra options for the critical components. The double- and triple- redundant architectures are shown in Fig. 
10 and Fig. 11, respectively. The objective is to identify the impact of redundancy on the safety and performance 
characteristics. 
 
Fig. 10 Double-Redundant Architecture just meeting the safety target 
 
Fig. 11 Triple-Redundant architecture 
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The redundant architectures result in multiple configurations. For instance, the double-redundant architecture has 
two configurations, as shown in Fig. 12. In order for the two air conditioning packs to be functioning independently 
(in case of failure), these should be sized in order to satisfy the total load from the aircraft cabin. Similarly, the other 
redundant components, including electric compressor and motor need to be sized for the total load. This leads to 
creation of two computational workflows (one for each configuration). In this particular case, the two computational 
workflows are identical. However, if the two configurations employ different means, then the two workflows would 
be different. For instance, if electric power is generated by three components, engine generator, battery, and ram air 
turbine, then the three resulting computational workflows would be different. Each workflow will be used to size their 
respective components. 
 
 
Fig. 12: Multiple Configurations resulting from Redundant Architecture 
The safety and performance characteristics of the two redundant architectures were assessed using the same 
methods which were applied to the simplified ECS architecture. First, the fault tree analysis models were generated 
automatically for the condition “failure to control cabin pressure” in order to determine the probability of failure. Next, 
the two architectures were evaluated for performance characteristics (power offtakes, mass, drag). The results of the 
two architectures are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Comparison of different ECS Architectures in terms of Safety and Performance Characteristics 
 Safety Performance 
ECS Architectures Probability of Failure 
to Control Pressure 
Power Offtake 
[kg/s or kW] 
Mass 
[lb] 
Ram Air 
Drag Coefficient 
Architecture 1: Conventional Bleed-Air 2.2 × 10−8 1.78 kg/s 1572 - 
Architecture 2: Simplified ECS 3.0 × 10−5 226 kW 997 0.000176 
Architecture 3: Double Redundant ECS 8.9 × 10−8 226 kW 1662 0.000176 
Architecture 4: Triple Redundant ECS 6.1 × 10−11 226 kW 2326 0.000176 
 
It can be observed from Table 3 that all the three electric ECS architectures (i.e. Architectures 2, 3, and 4) require 
power offtake of 226 kW with additional ram air drag coefficient of 0.000176. However, the mass and probability of 
failure to control pressure for the three electric ECS architectures are different. On one hand, increasing the number 
of redundant components reduces the probability of failure to control pressure, but on the other hand it increases the 
total mass of the ECS system. The three electric ECS architectures can be compared against the conventional ECS 
architecture (i.e. Architecture 1) in terms of mass and probability of failure to control pressure. However, conventional 
(bleed-air) and electric (bleed-less) architectures cannot be directly compared because the two architectures require 
different types of power offtakes (conventional ECS requires bleed air power offtake and electric ECS requires shaft 
power offtake. This implies that the two different types of ECS architectures should be compared at aircraft level. 
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Table 4 shows the aircraft level parameters for the four ECS architectures. It can be observed that all the three electric 
ECS architectures provide more range (column 3 in Table 4) compared to the conventional ECS architecture. The 
gross weight of the triple-redundant ECS architecture (Architecture 4) is greater than the conventional architecture 
(Architecture 1) due to extra ram air compressors, however, the range is still better than the conventional architecture. 
Please note that the thermal analysis was not conducted during these studies, which may reduce the performance of 
electric ECS architectures. 
Table 4: Comparison of different ECS Architectures in terms of Top-Level Aircraft Parameters 
Architectures 
Gross 
Weight 
[lb] 
Range 
[nmi] 
Takeoff 
Field 
Length 
[ft] 
Landing 
Field 
Length 
[ft] 
Approach 
Velocity 
[kts] 
Flyover 
Noise 
[EPNdB] 
Sideline 
Noise 
[EPNdB] 
Nitrogen 
Oxide 
Emissions 
[lb] 
Architecture 1 174146 2871.5 7463.84 5674.74 143.0 83.49 86.80 1054.83 
Architecture 2 173207 3089.1 7359.75 5652.22 142.6 83.36 86.86 955.43 
Architecture 3 173932 3076.1 7418.70 5669.60 142.9 83.38 86.85 960.24 
Architecture 4 174651 3063.2 7477.60 5686.56 143.2 83.42 86.84 965.01 
 
The presented methods for automatically generating the safety models (such as fault tree analysis) and 
computational workflows from the functional and logical flow views enable the architects to make better informed 
decisions, by conducting the trade-off between safety and performance characteristics at the early design stage. 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
Presented is a framework for aircraft subsystems sizing which also computes the effect of systems size on the resulting 
aircraft level performance. An essential part of the framework is safety analysis [4]. Thus integrated safety and 
performance analyses are enabled in early systems architecture design, and the study of possible trade-offs. The 
framework utilizes the Requirement, Functional, Logical, and Physical (RFLP) paradigm as a means of describing the 
architecture. RLFP is augmented here with a Mission & Flight Conditions domain, a Configurations domain and a 
Computational domain to facilitate the subsystems sizing process. The methodology consists of several steps. First, 
the various configurations that the architecture can adopt are determined. This includes failed configurations, which 
are determined with the help of the safety results provided by Fault Tree Analysis. For each one off them a workflow 
containing the associated computational models is assembled. Then, the systems are sized based on the worst case 
flight condition. It involves identifying all the flight conditions and then executing the computational workflow for 
each of the flight conditions of a configuration. The flight condition which requires the maximum power offtake 
becomes the worst case flight condition, and is used for sizing the components of the system. Finally, the aircraft level 
performance is evaluated while accounting for the masses, drag contributions and power outtakes of the subsystems, 
enabling safety and performance trade-offs. The concept is illustrated with a representative example, where an 
electrical environmental control system is sized following the suggested methodology and the aircraft level 
performance and possible trade-offs are studied. One of the main advantages of the proposed method is that instead 
of assessing systems at the single point in the mission segment, it enables systems sizing of extreme cases for safety 
consideration. 
Future work will include incorporation of the physical view, detailing aircraft geometry and subsystems spatial 
layout, in order to conduct ‘transversal studies’ such as thermal analysis. 
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